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We examine the neoclassical investment model using a panel of U.S.
manufacturing firms. The standard model with no financing constraints cannot
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problems might be expected to produce correlations between investment and
cash flow.
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Philadelphia, PA 19104-63671. Introduction
Recent research on determinants of firm-level fixed investment
has stressed the importance of proxies for firms' internal finance as an
explanatory variable, holding constant measures of firm opportunities
or the cost of capital.' Most such studies have been based on depar-
tures from neoclassical investment models with perfect capital markets
in the direction of models based on asymmetric information in financial
markets. These departures build on insights from theoretical models
of financial contracting under asymmetric information (using adverse
selection and/or moral hazard examples), in which movements in inter-
nal funds predict movements in investment spending, holding constant
investment opportunities.2
Many studies using different specifications of the neoclassi-
cal investment model and different data sets have convincingly re-
jected simple models based on the null hypothesis of perfect capi-
tal markets.3 Moreover, departures from the perfect-capital-markets
benchmark model indicate a role for internal funds. In particular, em-
pirical studies using firm-level panel data show greater failure of the
perfect-capital-markets neoclassical investment model for firms selected
to be a priori more likely to face capital-market frictions.
Given this background, our paper has two purposes. First,
we use an estimation strategy based on the Euler equation representa-
tion of firms' investment decisions. This strategy reflects reservations
1with standard investment models based on the q theory with adjust-
ment costs. In particular, there are well-known problems in measuring
marginal q, as well as concerns that observed stock market valuations
may not accord with the predictions of the efficient markets hypothesis
(owing either to irrational behavior or to the very problems of asym-
metric information stressed in alternative models).
Our second purpose is to explore the reasons why the standard
Euler equation for fixed investment may not fit well for all firms. In this
investigation we analyze data from Standard and Poor's COMPUSTAT
and separate the sample into several subsamples. Our starting point
is a comparison of the investment of one set of firms for which the
neoclassical model is assumed to hold to the investment of another
set for which "financing constraints" are assumed to be important.
These samples are constructed based on pre-sample dividend payout
ratios, with "high-payout" firms in the first sample and "low-payout"
firms in the second. The rationale for this delineation, a feature of
many studies in the empirical literature, is presented in section 2.
The standard model, in which there are no capital market frictions,
cannot be rejected for a sample of firms with high pre-sample dividend
payout ratios. On the other hand, the orthogonality conditions implied
by the standard model are decisively rejected for firms with low pre-
sample payout ratios. In trying to further understand these findings,
we examine several alternative explanations.
2Our first alternative is that the low-payout firms face a par-
ticular type of financing constraint.5 For tractability we assume that
these financing constraints are related to firms' cash flow, so that the
effective discount rate for one of these firms depends on its cash flow.
One novel aspect of our estimation is that we use firm tax payments
as an instrumental variable. To the extent that the marginal product
of capital is mismeasured, variables such as "cash flow" are correlated
with this measurement error, since they proxy for managers' perceived
profitability. Therefore, their addition to the model may improve its fit.
Using tax payments as an instrument minimizes the significance of this
measurement-error problem, since tax payments are very imperfectly
correlated with firm profitability owing to such factors as tax-loss car-
ryforwards and carrybacks (see, for example, Auerbach and Poterba,
1987). For firms for which the standard model fails, cash flow affects
investment in a way suggested by our alternative model; they do not
matter for the other firms.
A second alternative is to allow the effects of borrowing con-
straints in our extended model to vary not only with firms' individual
fortunes but also with macroeconomic conditions. Here we draw on
the recent literature that emphasizes the spread between risky and
default-free interest rates as a measure of the tightness of overall bor-
rowing conditions.6 Specifically, we parameterize borrowing constraints
so that both a firm's own cash flow and these spreads affect the extent
3to which the constraints bind. Taking account of macroeconomic con-
ditions significantly improves the performance of the model.
Finally, we provide some evidence on the nature of the capital-
market imperfections that might be responsible for our findings. The
"free cash flow" models of Jensen (1986) and others have suggested
that observed links between investment spending and internal finance
could reflect managers' decisions to ignore signals from market valua-
tion in favor of overinvestment in growth. Hence, a finding of a positive
correlation between investment and cash flow need not be construed as
evidence in favor of financing constraints. In fact there is very little
empirical work that can be used to discriminate between the Jensen
hypothesis and the financing constraints hypothesis, even though both
hypotheses start from a presumption that information and incentive
problems are important. To distinguish between the two alternatives,
we contrast the behavior of a set of mature firms in our sample with
the remaining firms. Although the mature firms are selected to fit
Jensen's description, we find that their business fixed investment is
well described by a standard Euler equation. Thus, while the Jensen-
style agency model may well be important in explaining other uses of
firms' resources, it does not appear to be important for business fixed
investment.7
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we derive an
investment model based on the Euler equation corresponding to firms'
4intertemporal optimization problem for capital accumulation. In the
presence of financial constraints, the Euler equation contains testable
implications for alternative models. Section 3 outlines a set of tests
to exploit cross-sectional predictions of this framework for differences
in the appropriate specification of investment models for "constrained"
and "unconstrained" firms. The data and our empirical tests are re-
ported in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Modeling the Investment Decision
Analyzing investment demand begins with an expression for
the value of the firm, which in turn stems from the arbitrage condition
governing the valuation of shares.8 The after-tax return to the owners
of the firm at time i reflects capital appreciation and current dividends.
In equilibrium, if the owners are to be content holding their shares, this
return must equal their required return,
(1
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where, l's, is the value of firm i at time i; denotes the value of
new shares issued at time t + 1; cisan accrual-equivalent capital gains
tax rate; and E is the expectation operator conditional on information
known at time t. The after-tax capital gain of the current shareholders
thus consists of the change in the market value of the firm less the
component of this change due to new share issues. The dividends of
5the firm at time i + 1 are d1,+i, and 8 is the tax rate on dividends.
In the absence of any bubbles, solving (1) forward yields the
following expression for the firm's market value at time zero, where 8jj
is the firm's one-period discount factor.




The firm maximizes equation (2) subject to five constraints.
The first is the capital stock accounting identity:
K1 =I,+ (1 — (3)
where K1 is the capital stock of firm i at the end of time t, 1it iS
its investment at time i and 5 is the constant rate of economic depre-
ciation. The second constraint defines firm dividends. Cash inflows
include sales, new share issues, and net borrowing, while cash outflows
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where:
Nj =avector of variable factors of production for firm i at time t
Wt =avector of real factor prices at time i
=thereal value of net debt outstanding for firm i at time i
=thenominal interest rate paid on corporate bonds at time L
6= theexpected inflation rate at time t
=theprice of capital goods at time t relative to the price of
output at time t (incorporating tax considerations)
r =thecorporate income tax rate
F(K,1_i,N1) =thefirm's real revenue function (FK > 0, FKK <
0)
i(Ijg,K,,g_i) =thereal cost of adjusting the capital stock (iI.'j >
0, t,bjj > 0, 7,bK <0,
1PIK<O)
The third constraint restricts dividends to be non-negative.
d1 ￿ 0. (5)
The fourth constraint limits share repurchases. This restriction is nec-
essary since the differential between the taxes on dividends and capital
gains allows the firm to increase its value by cutting dividends and
using share repurchases to distribute cash to its stockholders.
(6)
The fifth constraint is a transversality condition which prevents the
firm from borrowing an infinite amount to pay out as dividends:
urnfJf3 BT=0,Vt. (7) T—.oo
Letbe the series of Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraint (5), and let m represent the ratio (1—9)1(1—-c). Substituting
7(4) into (2) for d,, and using (3) to eliminate I from the problem, the
first order conditions for the capital stock (K1) and the stock of net
external debt (B) can be calculated as:
Ef3[(m.)i÷i)(FK(KINI,+l) —,bK(I1,+l,Kl)(8)
+(1 —6) ''))]=j(I1,K,1)+(1—r)
(m + \) —fl(1+ (1 —r)i—irflEt(rn + )'jt+l)=0 (9)
To obtain an equation for investment, it is necessary to param-
eterize the adjustment cost function, t,t'(I1,K1,....1). The tradition in
the q literature since Summers (1981) and Hayashi (1982) has been to
specify adjustment costs that are linearly homogeneous in investment
and capital, so that marginal and average q will be equal (see Haya.shi,
1982). A convenient parameterizatlon that adheres to these constraints
is:
t/)(It,K2,1_1)= —lit. (10)
where the bliss point in the adjustment function is given by v.9 By
differentiating (10) with respect to I and K1, and substituting these
results into (8), one obtains:
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expectations are rational and allow for an
,whereE(e1+1)=0and =o.
withanyinformationknown at time i.This
(9)allow usto write equation (11) as:
(1+ (1 —r)i —7r)[FK(KNIi+l) + (Ii÷i)2
+a(1—5)''' +(1—6) _v)]
(12)
lit Pit —a — +v=e,t+i K,_1(1 —r)
To move from equation (11) to (12), we have also made the
strong assumption that the conditional covariance between (m+)i,t+i)/
(m + ))andother t + 1 dated variables is constant. Under the null
hypothesis of no capital-market frictions, this is a natural assumption
since this term should equal unity. Thus, in principle, one reason why
the restrictions implied by equation (12) might be rejected is the fail-
ure of this assumption. In practice, this assumption will fail in the
presence of financing constraints, since one of the manifestations of
financing problems will be a binding constraint on dividend payout.
Since one of our goals is to develop a parametric alternative model
9that allows for borrowing constraints, we are forced to take a stand on
how such constraints might operate. By making the strong simplifying
assumption that this conditional covariance is constant, we therefore
are constructing an alternative model that emphasizes the relaxation of
borrowing constraints rather than the relaxation of a dividend payout
constraint. Because the two constraints are so closely linked, this dis-
tinction is arbitrary, but we would be unable to develop an alternative
model without addressing this issue.
In our extended model we incorporate financial factors by adding
a constraint on the use of debt finance by firms. In particular, we as-
sume that the outstanding debt, must be less than a debt ceiling
B,.'°Theceiling, while possibly unobservable to the econometrician,
depends on measures of firm financial health. That is, movements in
firms' financial health will affect their ability to finance investment,
holding constant actual investment opportunities. If we let wrepre-
sent the series of Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraint
that B <B,we can rewrite the first-order condition in (9) as:
(m+A,)—i31,(1+(i—r)i =0 (13)
It is convenient to normalize w relative to (m+.) and denote
the resulting ratio by .Inthis case /3, equals:
1 — (rn+ )'÷i) = . E (14)
(m+)hjg)
10Accordingly, (12) would then be amended to:
(1+(1hi-) N÷)+ (Ii+ )2
+c(1 —6)''+ (1 —6)
— (15)
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Underthe hypothesis of perfect capital markets, both the con-
straints on outside debt and equity finance are redundant, so that
=0.The multiplierrepresents the value of a marginal dol-
lar of cash flow to the firm. \giszero in period t when firm i is
paying dividends. Under the assumptions here, a firm expecting to pay
dividends in the current and future periods (= = 0)would
not face a high shadow cost of external finance, since the firm could
reduce dividend payments to finance investment.11 Hence, in (15),
=0;and the discount factor, assumesthe traditional form:
1/(1 + (1 —7)Ij
—rfl.We will use generalized method of moments
(GMM) to test for misspecification of (15). With a set of instrumental
variables that are orthogonal to the error term, the orthogonality con-
ditions should not be rejected for (15) under the null hypothesis of no
capital-market frictions (that is, where both ij= 0and=0.)12
On the other hand under the alternative model with capital-
market frictions, isnot restricted to be zero. Hence, orthogo-
nality conditions associated with (15) under the assumptions of the
11perfect-capital-markets model should be rejected. Under the financing-
constraint alternative, orthogonality conditions should be rejected for
non-dividend-paying firms and accepted for high-payout firms.
3. Issues for Econometric Estimation
Three issues arise in the estimation of equation (12). First, the
model is nonlinear in both the parameters and in the ratio of investment
to capital, (I1/K,_1). In addition, there is a simultaneity problem
because of the presence of the expected marginal product of capital in
the model. These two considerations require estimation by generalized
method of moments, where we use the method presented in Newey and
West (1987) to obtain a positive-definite optimal weighting matrix. The
exact set of instrumental variables used is discussed below and shown
in the tables outlining our estimation results.
Second, we want to allow for the possibility that there are fixed
firm-specific and time-specific effects in the equation. We include year
dummies to deal with the latter. However, because of the presence of
the lagged dependent variable, the common practice of eliminating the
individual firm effect by removing the means from the variables in the
regression will violate the orthogonality conditions used to identify the
model. Instead, we first-difference equation (12) and then use twice-
lagged instruments, which will still be orthogonal to the moving-average
error that the differencing creates.
12Finally, the exact form of the model depends on whether the
constraints on outside finance bind or not. We consider both possibil-
ities here. First, as suggested in section 2, we split the sample into
two groups: those that are a priori constrained and those that are not,
using as a criterion the pre-sample dividend payout ratios of the firms.
We then use the full sample and the two sub-samples to estimate the
model in (12) with the multiplier, constrainedto equal zero. To
estimate the unconstrained model, we parameterize asa function
of observables.
Jensen (1986) has emphasized a potential link between internal
funds and corporate expenditures (including capital spending), hold-
ing constant investment opportunities, not arising from financing con-
straints but from management's use of internal funds for non-value-
maximizing projects. Specifically, Jensen argues that high levels of
"free cash flow" (measured as the difference between cash receipts and
the sum of cash disbursements and spending on profitable investment
opportunities) raise corporate expenditures independent of underlying
expected future profitability. Such a measure is unobservable. Precisely
in those cases for which the theory is correct, we should be unable to
use reported investment data to construct the measure.
Because there are too few firms in our sample in the indus-
tries discussed by Jensen (1986)—including petroleum, tobacco, and
food products—we sought to define a broader class of "mature" in-
13dustries. In an empirical study of implications of models of oligopoly
supergames for the level and adjustment of markups of price over
marginal cost, Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1987) selected 39
4-digit S.I.C. manufacturing industries as "mature" with high aver-
age profitability, as measured by the price cost margin over the period
from 1958 to 1981.' These industries include those cited by Jensen
and share the common characteristics of: (i) being in the "producer
goods" sector;'4 (ii) being recognized by the Census of Manufactur-
ers at least since 1958; (iii) having a four-firm concentration ratio of
greater than 0.50 (in 1972);' and (iv) not being listed as "miscella-
neous" or "not elsewhere classified." Though designed for a differ-
ent purpose, the Domowitz-Hubbard-Petersen criteria identify mature,
homogeneous-goods oligopolies operating in well-defined markets.
4.Data
Beforereporting our estimation results, we describe the data.
Most come from the combined annual, research, and full-coverage 1989
COMPUSTAT industrial files. The firms in the combined annual and
research files are all listed on either the NYSE or the AMEX and are
generally quite large. By contrast, the full-coverage file contains a num-
ber of smaller firms whose stock is less actively traded. Such diversity
is important to this study, since we focus on potential cross-sectional
differences in investment patterns.
14Our sample selection procedure is as follows. First, we con-
sider only the manufacturing sector. Second, we delete any firm with
missing or inconsistent data. Finally, we delete any firm that experi-
enced a merger accounting for more than fifteen percent of its value.
The sample thus obtained contains 428 firms: 314 from the combined
annual file, 34 from the research file, and 80 from the full-coverage file.
The sample period runs from 1976 to 1987.16
The details of the construction of the regression variables and
the instruments can be found in the data appendix in Whited (1992).
We discuss the most significant points below. First, we need to express
the marginal product of capital in terms of observable measures. If
firms are imperfectly competitive and set prices as a constant markup,




where Y.1.1 is output at time 2 + 1 and isreal variable costs at
time I + 1. One benefit of this specification is that it provides us with
an estimated markup parameter that can be used to assess the model.
Our list of instrumental variables includes twice-lagged values
of each of the variables in the model as well as the variables used to
parameterize .Inaddition, we use depreciation charges divided by
the capital stock, interest expense divided by the capital stock, the ratio
of the market value of debt to the market value of debt plus equity, the
15ratio of interest expense to the sum of interest expense and cash flow,
and the ratio of tax payments to the sum of tax payments and cash
flow.
Summary statistics for the sample are shown in Table 1. The
first column in the table reports mean and median values for selected
variables for the full sample of 428 firms. The heterogeneity which we
have discussed is especially clear in terms of size: Comparing the mean
and median values for the capital stock measure reveals that there is
considerable variation in the size of our firms. Contrasting the mean
and median values of the other variables suggests that there may be
additional interesting cross-sectional variation in, the propensity to use
debt financing (debt-assets ratio) and in retention behavior (payout
ratios).
We next report the summary measures after splitting the sam-
ple according to the retention and concentration measures introduced
earlier. The second column gives statistics for 71 firms we categorize
as "high dividend payout" firms. These firms were selected according
to their average payout ratio, defined as the ratio of dividends to oper-
ating income, in the two years prior to the start of the sample.'7 By
using pre-sample information for the sorting, we avoid problems aris-
ing if firms make their dividend and investment decisions on the basis
of common factors that are unobservable to the econometrician. The
third column in the table shows statistics for the remaining 357 fIrms,
16subsequently referred to as either "not high" or "low" dividend paying
firms.
Along most dimensions the two sets of firms appear to be sim-
ilar. There are, however, two striking differences between them. First,
and not surprisingly, over the entire sample, the high-dividend-payout
firms tend to pay out roughly twice as much of their operating income
as dividends to their shareholders. Second, these firms also seem to be
noticeably larger than the low-dividend-payout firms. The size differ-
ences between the high- and low-payout firms has been widely noted.
However, size differences do not seem to account for the reduced form
evidence on credit market imperfections mentioned in the introduction
(for instance, see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; and Gilchrist,
1991). In the last two rows of Table 2, we show that our subsequent
Euler equation tests are also not due to pure size differences.'8 Thus,
although there are substantial differences in the typical size of the firms
in these two groups, we do not believe that size differences, per se are
responsible for the findings in the next section.
In the next column of Table 1 we report summary statistics for
firms in the industries that Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1987),
DHP hereafter, classified as mature, concentrated, high-markup indus-
tries. We will refer to the 45 firms in our sample in these industries
as "mature" firms. Statistics for the remaining 383 "not-mature"firms
are shown in the last column of the table. While the concentratedin-
17dustries were selected by DHP for a different purpose, we believe that
the firms in these industries conform to a description of firms for which
free-cash-flow problems are likely to be severe. Unfortunately, since
free cash flow is not observable, verifying this assertion is difficult.
Nevertheless, there is some indirect evidence shown in Table
1 that can be used to assess whether the mature firms fit Jensen's
description of firms with high free cash flow. First, the mature firms
are typically much larger than the non-mature firms. Thefree-cash-
flow approach emphasizes managerial incentives which reward growth
(even if it is not in shareholders interests) as one of the key factors
underlying his theory. Since mature industries tend to be relatively
capital intensive, comparisons of capital stocks probably overstate the
size differences. For instance, in terms of debt plus equity, the size gap
between the median mature and not-mature firm is closer to a factor of
three rather than the factor of four implied by the capital comparison.'9
Either way, the mature firms are noticeably larger than the not-mature
firms, a plausible pattern according to the free-cash-flow story.
Perhaps more important, the mature firms do not seem to have
high payout ratio6. Despite the large size differences, the median pay-
out rates are nearly identical for the mature and non-mature firms.
Given the general tendency for larger firms to pay out more in divi-
dends, this finding is particularly surprising. The reluctance to pay out
dividends is one of the principal features of the firms with free cash flow.
18Furthermore, the similarity in payout ratios suggest that the outcome
of any tests comparing the mature and not-mature firms could not be
inferred merely from knowing the results of analogous tests done using
samples selected on the basis of retention behavior. For instance, only
10 of the 45 mature firms fit our description of high-payout firms. Thus
there appears to be useful additional information that can be obtained
from analyzing this subsample.
5. Euler Equation Estimates
The analysis we present is sequential. Our first step is to esti-
mate equation (12), the baseline neoclassical investment model which
assumes perfect capital markets. Under the assumption of no capital-
market frictions, there are two structural parameters which can be
recovered: c, the quadratic adjustment parameter and p, the markup
parameter. The point estimates for these parameters, along with stan-
dard errors and the .J-statistic computed to test the model's overiden-
tifying restrictions are shown in Table 2. The estimates based on the
full sample (of 428 firms) are given in the first row. For this sample of
firms, the overidentifying restrictions are decisively rejected; the resid-
uals from the equation are strongly correlated with at least some of our
instruments. The instruments are listed at the bottom of the table.
Having demonstrated that the standard model is rejected for
the full sample, we next investigate whether this rejection is related to
19retention behavior. The next two rows present the results when the
model is reestimated separately for the high- and low-dividend-payout
firms. The model performs quite well for the high-payout firms but less
satisfactorily for the low-payout firms. In particular, the overidentify-
ing restrictions are strongly rejected for the low-payout firms and not
rejected for the high-payout firms. In both cases the estimated markup
of prices over costs is plausibly estimated to be between 20 and 40
percent. In addition, for the high payout firms the adjustment cost
estimates are more plausible than the estimates typically derived from
the q-theory approach.2° Thus, for the high-dividend-payout firms the
standard model seems relatively successful.
A key issue in interpreting the results is whether the rejection
for the low-payout firms is indeed due to capital-market frictions. We
investigate this question with several different tests. First, we consider
the possibility suggested by the free-cash-flow approach. Investment
and cash flow may be correlated because of managers opportunistic
use of free cash flow. To study this suggestion we further separated the
low-payout firms to isolate the mature firms. As we argued earlier, these
firms are a priori more susceptible to the agency problems. Therefore,
if the problem with the low-payout firms is an excessive amount of free
cash flow, then rejection of the model should be most pronounced for
this subsample.
The last row in Table 2 shows the estimates for the mature,
20low-payout subsample. The model does reasonably well. Both the
estimated markup parameter and the adjustment cost parameter are
plausible and in line with the estimates for the other sample splits.
Most importantly, the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected.
Hence, the rejection of the standard model is not traceable to the "ma-
ture, low-payout" firms.21 We do not view this evidence as particu-
larly damaging to the general assertion that agency-cost considerations
might be important. Rather, the free cash flow story does not appear
to explain the effect of internal funds, holding constant investmentop-
portunities on investment in plant and equipment. In the remainder of
this section, we attempt to rehabilitate the frictionless-capital-markets
model to explain the investment by the low-dividend-payout sample of
firms.22
As next step, we allow the value ofthe multiplier associated
with the constraint on outside financing, tovary with internal funds.
Our simplest specification allows the extent to which the constraint on
debt accumulation binds depends on the firms cash position, i.e.,
- CFj = 7o+ , (17)
whereCF represents the firm's cash flow (earnings plus depreciation
charges). As mentioned earlier, this type of constraint has been used in
several studies, including Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), Whited (1992),
and Himmelberg (1990).Giventhis parameterization for y1mea-
21sures the change in the firm's effective discount factor which occurs as
a result of an increase in internal funds holding constant investment
opportunities.
This specification also raises several issues. One would expect
that 71< 0;increases in internal funds, ceteris paribus, relax the con-
straint on external finance. This same logic has been used to justify
the reduced-form test that include measures of internal funds in re-
gressions that also include Tobin's q. In that context, one potential
objection with using observations of firm cash flow as a measure of in-
ternal funds is that shifts in cash flow may contain information about
expected future investment opportunities. In our setup the analogous
objection would be that the marginal product of capital as parameter-
ized in (16) is mismeasured, so that cash flow again carries information
regarding the future profitability of capital. Depending on the serial
correlation of the measurement error, it is possible that even lagged
values of cash flow would fail to be valid instruments because of the
potential correlation with the unobservable component of the marginal
product of capital.
To address these concerns, we use firms' corporate tax pay-
ments as an instrumental variable. By its statutory description, the
corporate income tax is proportional (for firms as large as those in our
sample). Nevertheless, there are many reasons to believe that average
tax payments are poorly described as the product of the statutory cor-
22porate income tax rate and profits. Sources of this discrepancy include
the presence of firms with tax losses (owing to the imperfect loss off-
sets in the tax code), the use of investment tax credits, and changes in
capital recovery provisions in the tax code (see Auerbach and Poterba,
1987; and Altshuler and Auerbach, 1990). Hence, tax payments are
only imperfectly correlated with true profits, and their use as an in-
strument minimizes the importance of this measurement problem.23
The results from estimating this augmented model are shown
in the first column of Table 3. The size of the rejection of the model's
overidentifying restrictions declines slightly, but nevertheless, the re-
strictions are still firmly rejected. En addition, the implied impact on
the discount rate is quite modest. For instance, a decrease in cash flow
relative to capital of 25 percent (e.g.,from0.4 to 0.3) would lower the
discount factor by just over 0.009 (0.086 x 0.1). Given that the average
discount factor over the sample period is 0.99, this difference is quite
small.
One reason that this extension of the model may be incomplete
is that it implicitly assumes that the constraint is equally binding at all
times, so that a given increase in cash flow has the same impact in all
periods. To investigate the consequences of this symmetry restriction,
we further parameterize c so that constraint on external finance de-
pends not only on the firm's own cash position but also on a proxy for
the overall tightness of borrowing conditions. We use the first differ-
23ence of the spread between the interest rate on six-month commercial
paper and the interest rate on six-month Treasury bills as ourproxy.24
Thus, we now consider the following parameterization for
CF CF
Wit= 70+ 71,+i'zs, (18)
!jt—1
The estimated coefficients from the model incorporating (18)
are presented in the second column of Table 3. Relaxing the symmetry
restriction improves the model in a two dimensions. First, the oven-
dentifying restrictions are no longer rejected. Second, the implied size
of the changes in the discount factor are more significant. For instance,
in the example of a 25 percent drop in cash flow considered above,
a concurrent increase in the first difference of the spread of ten ba-
sis points would imply a decrease in fi of 0.037. Hence, by allowing
common movements in credit-market conditions to affect the severity
of firm-specific financing constraints we find more variation in firms'
implied discount rates, and that the model's restrictions are no longer
rejected.25
6. Concluding Remarks
An emerging literature has suggested that the failure of neo-
classical investment models to explain firm-level investment behavior
is due to the assumption of frictionless capital markets. While recent
empirical studies have concluded that internal funds are likely to be an
24important determinant of investment for many firms in the presence
in information imperfections in capital markets, problems of interpre-
tation exist. First, models of investment demand based on Tobin's
q or models which use stock market valuation as a proxy for the ex-
pected future profitability of invested capital require additional strong
assumptions about the efficiency of capital markets. Second, a link
between investment and internal funds, holding constant investment
opportunities, could also reflect wasteful investment spending by non-
value-maximizing corporate managers.
This paper addresses these concerns in three parts. First, we
formulate tests of the null hypothesis of frictionless capital markets us-
ing the Euler equation for intertemporal capital accumulation. We are
unable to reject the standard neoclassical model for firms with signifi-
cant dividend payouts. This model is easily rejected, however, for firms
in a low-dividend-payout subsample. Second, to test whether this rejec-
tion is traceable to a correlation between internal funds and investment
spending and free cash flow considerations, we examine sample splits
based on firm "maturity." The model is not rejected for mature firms
with low dividend payouts. Finally we specify an alternative model
in which firms' cost of funds depends upon firm-specific cash flow and
a measure of tightness in aggregate credit conditions. Both measures
affect investment for the sample of firms for which the neoclassical
model is rejected, and the alternative model is not rejected when both
25additional variables are included.
We believe that our evidence for firm-level investment indicates
the significance of capital-market imperfections in affecting investment
decisions. At least two directions for future research appear promising.
The first is to trace the evolution of firms' terms of trade in capital
markets in a model in which firms switch among financing regimes
(see, for example, the research agenda outlined in Pakes, 1991). The
second is to examine case studies of firms in particular industries for
which capital-market frictions appear most relevant (see, for example,
Reiss, 1990).
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1. See for example Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988); Bond and
Meghir (1990); Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991); Whited
(1992); Gilchrist (1991); Himmelberg (1991); and Reiss (1990).
See Meyer and Kuh (1957) for an early study along these lines.
More recently, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1992) extend the ap-
proach suggested originally by Abel and Blanchard (1986) to con-
struct proxies for marginal q in investment equations. They then
test whether cash flow is an independent "fundamental" variable
explaining investment. They find both that cash flow is an inde-
pendent fundamental and that excess sensitivity of investment to
cash flow is primarily a characteristic of firms with low dividend
payouts.
2. See for example Jaffee and Russell(1976); Leland and Pyle (1977);
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984);
Myers and Majluf(1984); Bernanke and Gertler (1990); Calomiris
and Hubbard (1990); and the review of approaches in Gertler
(1988).
3. See the studies enumerated in footnote 1, and the overview in
Hubbard (1990).
4. See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988); Gilchrist (1991); Him-
melberg (1991), Whited (1992); and Calomiris and Hubbard
(1991).
5. We build on the approach developed in Hubbard and Kashyap
(1992) and Whited (1992).
6. See Gertler, Hubbard, and Kashyap (1991) and Kashyap, Stein,
and Wilcox (1993) for a discussion of these issues.
7. See Gertler and Hubbard (1988) for a formal discussion of this
point.
8. This derivation follows Poterba and Summers (1985) and others.
9. Other specifications that satisfy the Hayashi (1982) conditions
yield similar Euler equations. For instance, allowing t,b(I, K,_i)
to be [ao(I1*/K,t_j —v)+ (ci/2)(Ig/K,t._i —v)2}K;,..ias in
Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), then the estimating equations an-
alyzed below are identical except for the constant terms.
3110. This approach implicitly assumes that firms facing imperfections
in debt markets face imperfections in new equity finance as well,
so that the alternative hypothesis is that external finance from ei-
ther source is differentially costly relative to internal finance. For
example, one could follow the approach taken by Fazzari, Hub-
bard, and Petersen (1988), who incorporate a "lemons' premium"
in the cost of new equity issues.
11. That is, we adopt the "tax capitalization" model of firms' divi-
dend decisions, as in King (1977), Auerbach (1979), and Bradford
(1981). In this approach firms would not pay dividends and issue
new shares simultaneously, because of adverse tax consequences.
Dividend-paying firms are those with cash flows from existing
projects exceeding their new investment opportunities. This as-
sumption is really made for simplicity of exposition; firms' divi-
dends may be valued by investors on the basis of agency-cost or
other considerations (see Poterba and Summers, 1985, and oth-
ers). All that is needed for our purposes is to restrict a sample of
firms whose significant payout is unlikely to fall below zero.
12. The GMM technique minimizes a quadratic objective function
which uses an optimal weighting matrix based on initial param-
eter estimates. The model will be overidentified as long as the
number of instrumental variables used exceeds the number of pa-
rameters to be estimated. The test is formulated as follows. Un-
der the null hypothesis of orthogonality of the instruments and
the error terms, the product of the minimized value of the ob-
jective function and the number of observations is distributed as
a x2statisticwith n degrees of freedom, where n is the differ-
ence between the numbers of instruments and parameters. The
overidentifying restrictions are rejected if the x2valueis too high.
13. The industries are described in Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1987).
14. The producer goods classification is based on the percentage of
shipments of output for final demand in four categories: con-
sumption investment, materials, and government. If fifty percent
or more of an industry's output went to investment plus materi-
als, it was classified as a producer-goods industry.
15. Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen used the four-firm concentra-
tion ratios constructed by Weiss and Pa.scoe (1981), which adjust
for inappropriate product groupings and geographic fragmenta-
tion.
16. The sample stops in 1987 because of the discontinuity in the ac-
counting data that accompanied COMPUSTAT's shift to report-
ing consolidated financial reports.
3217. The results reported here are based on a cutoff of 0.17, and vary-
ing this cutoff had little effect.
18. Whited (1992) and Gilchrist (1991) also confirm that size differ-
ences do not account for the success or failure of Euler-equation
tests for capital market imperfections.
19. Similarly, the ratio of cash flow to assets (debt plus equity) sug-
gests that the mature firms have slightly higher cash flows than
the not-mature firms.
20. Given the point estimate for a, the marginal cost of adjusting
investment, t,bj, for the average high payout firm is about 21 cents
per dollar. This calculation assumes that (I1/K1,_1 —v)is equal
to the sample average of 0.1.
21. To ensure that the differences in statistical significance across
subsamples are not merely an artifact of differences in sample
size, we conducted the following Monte Carlo experiments. First,
we drew with replacement 1000 random samples of size 71 from
the not-high-dividend subsample and rejected the model at the
nominal 10 percent level 84.3 percent of the time. Second, when
we conducted a similar experiment with 1000 random samples
of size 35 from the not-mature, not-high-dividend subsample, we
rejected the model 74.8 percent of the time. We are grateful to a
referee for suggesting this experiment.
22. In what follows, the results are virtually unaffected by whether
we include or exclude the 35 mature firms from the analysis.
23. It is possible, of course, that a rejection of any of our models
may be due to the presence of measurement error as well as to
misspecification in the presence of financial constraints. Since it is
unlikely that measurement error varies systematically across our
different samples, we view our pattern of rejections as suggesting
capital market imperfections.
24. See Gertler, Hubbard, and Kashyap (1991) and Kashyap, Stein,
and Wilcox (1993) for a further discussion of the information
content of the spread. Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Stock
and Watson (1989) have noted that this interest-rate differential
has had greater predictive power for output (over most of the
postwar period) than money, interest rates, or other financial
variables.
25. We view this result as only suggestive. One could, for example,
use year dummies instead of 8g.Inthis case, however, the source
of the aggregate effect is unidentified.
33Table 1
Summary Statistics for Selected Variables
for 428 U.s. Manufacturing Firms, 1976-1987
Group of Firms
Full High Not High Not
SampleDividendDividendMatureMature
428 Firms71 Firms357 Firms45 Firms383 Firms
I / K, ,,_
Mean .226 .199 .231 .208 .228
Median .204 .100 .211 .186 .205
Capital Stock
Mean1026.5 1636.2 905.2 1056.2 1023.8
Median 88.2 275.3 72.5 336.3 78.7
CF1 / K,, —1
Mean .389 .408 .386 .309 .396
Median .343 .335 .345 .281 .348
/ K,,,_
Mean4.78 4.18 4.91 3.66 4.89
Median4.12 3.26 4.23 2.76 4.20
Debt Assets Ratio
Mean .248 .208 .256 .282 .245
Median .209 .179 .218 .235 .207
Interest Coverage
Mean .141 .121 .145 .135 .142
Median .137 .118 .140 .142 .137
Payout Ratio
Mean .142 .254 .120 .258 .132
Median .118 .200 .107 .115 .118
Definitions:
=(thisyear'sinvestment)/(thereplacement value of lastyear's cap-
ita.Istock)
Capital Stock =thereplacement value of plant, property, and equipment (mil-
lions of 1982 dollars)
CF/K,,_1 =(operatingincome plus depreciation charges)/(the replacement
value of last year'scapitalstock)
=(thisyear's output)/(the replacement value of last year's capital
stock)
Debt Assets Ratio =(themarket value of debt)/(the market value of debt plus
equity)
InterestCoverage=(interestpayments)! (interest payments plus cash flow plus
4 (to ensure a positive number))
Payout Ratio =(dividends)/(operatingincome)
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aStandard errors areshownin parentheses. The standard errors are corrected
for the moving average errors induced by differencing using the Newey-West (1987)
procedure. Coefilcients sigmflcant at the 5% level are indicated with two asterisks;
one asterisk indicates signigicance at the 10% level. Significance levels for tests of
overidentifying restrictions are shown in parentheses beneath the test statistic.
The instrument set used in estimation includes I/K, (I/K)2, Output/K, (Price
of Capital)/(Price of Output), Taxes/K, Depreciation Charges/K, Interest Ex-
pense/K, Debt/Assets, Interest Coverage, Taxes/(Taxes + Cash flow), (Cost of
goods sold + General Selling and Administrative Expenses)/K. All variables are
lagged two periods and the capital stocks used in the normalizations are always
measured as of the beginning of the period.
35Table 3
Neoclassical Investment Model Augmented for both
Firm-Specific and Time-Varying Capital Market
Imperfections
(357 Firms with Low Payout Ratios, 1976-1987)'
Adjustment Cost 0.967 1.277
Parameter — (0.683) (0.501)
Mark-up —p 1.358*8 1.409*8
(0.083) (0.068)
Shadow Cost, 0.086** -0.138
Firm specific — (0.005) (0.104)
Shadow Cost, -0.024
time varying —72x (0.012)
Test of Overidentifying 15.81 7.47
Restrictions —x2 (0.015) (0.188)
aStandarderrors are shown in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected
for the moving average errors induced by differencing using the Newey-West (1987)
procedure. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are indicated with two asterisks;
one asterisk indicates signigicance at the 10% levd. Significance levels for tests of
overidentifying restrictions are shown in parentheses beneath the test statistic.
The instrument eeL used in estimation includes I/K, (I/K)2, Output/K, (Price
of Capital)/(Price of Output), Taxes/K, Depreciation Charges/K, Interest Ex-
pense/K, Debt/Assets, Interest Coverage, Taxes/(Taxes + Cash flow), (Cost of
goods sold + General Selling and Administrative Expenses)/K. All variables are
lagged two periods and the capital stocks used in the normalizations are always
measured as of the beginning of the period. There are 7 and 6 overidentifying
restriction for the models in columns 2 and 3, respectively.
36